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Attention and Reputation: Linking Regulators’ Internal and External Worlds

  • Sharon Gilad
Part of the The Executive Politics and Governance series book series (EXPOLGOV)

Abstract

The responsiveness of regulatory agencies and other bureaucracies to their political environment is a key concern of executive politics research.1 Given the salience of this issue it is surprising how little we know about the informal institutional structures and dynamics that mediate bureaucracies’ responsiveness to external signals and demands. The aim of this chapter is to theorize, and to empirically illustrate, this process of internal mediation. Its particular focus is on the shaping of regulators’ prioritization of tasks as one important indicator of their responsiveness. It asks: how do regulatory agencies prioritize their tasks in the light of external signals?

Keywords

External Signal Corporate Reputation American Political Science Review Business Regulation Financial Service Authority 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Sharon Gilad 2012

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  • Sharon Gilad

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