The Military: Ambitious Institution, Ad lib Individuals

  • Christopher Ankersen
Chapter
Part of the Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies book series (RCS)

Abstract

Although Clausewitz is correct in saying the war is the product of several factors, at its very core lays the military. Military activity may be initiated by the government and influenced by the people, but men and women, in uniform, on the ground, carry it out. Following the framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter will examine the military’s part in the practice of civil–military cooperation.1 The chapter is based on a series of two related questions. First, we will examine how the military conceived of its role. Second, we shall turn to how they turned that understanding into practice, vis-à-vis civil–military cooperation.

Keywords

Canadian Society Humanitarian Relief Humanitarian Operation Intelligence Gathering Mission Analysis 
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Notes

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© Christopher Ankersen 2014

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  • Christopher Ankersen

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