Efficiency, Equality and Public Policy pp 82-98 | Cite as
A Dollar is a Dollar: Solution to the Paradox of Interpersonal Cardinal Utility
Chapter
Abstract
As explained in Chapter 2, the impossibility theorems of Arrow (1951/1963), Kemp and Ng (1976), Parks (1976), and Sen (1969, 1970a) prove, and even just common-sense arguments demonstrate, that interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility are necessary for making social choice which cannot reasonably be based on individual ordinal preferences only.
Keywords
Distributional Weight Income Taxation Preferential Treatment Disincentive Effect Redistributive Effect
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© Yew-Kwang Ng 2000