Introduction: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self

Abstract

In Western philosophy there exist many theories of consciousness and the self. While Eastern input into this debate is not yet mainstream, it is gaining momentum as Western interest in this tradition grows. As part of a wider project (mentioned in the Preface) this book will attempt to explicate and develop some Buddhist ideas on consciousness and the self into a substantial position in the philosophy of mind. The position will bestow illusory status to the self as a whole, but a non-illusory status to several features that are ascribed to the self, features that I argue are intrinsic to consciousness. What makes this account unconventional is that standard Western accounts of self-as-illusion, following in the tradition of Hume and James, usually consider most of these ascribed features (in particular, those I refer to as unity and unbrokenness) to have an illusory status in themselves; they are what make the self illusory.