Population Ethics and the Value of Life

  • Charles Blackorby
  • Walter Bossert
  • David Donaldson
Part of the Studies in Development Economics and Policy book series (SDEP)


Public policies frequently involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of ranking alternatives with different populations and population sizes are required.


Critical Level Utility Level Social Evaluation Worth Living Utility Distribution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© United Nations University 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles Blackorby
  • Walter Bossert
  • David Donaldson

There are no affiliations available

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