Introduction

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Acknowledging the significance of Rawls’s influence on political philosophy in twentieth century, Raphael suggests that no knowledgeable scholar has accepted his theory as a sound theory of justice. See David. D. Raphael, Concepts of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 196.Google Scholar

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See Daniel A. Dombrowski, Rawls and Religion, The Case for Political Liberalism, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. vii.Google Scholar

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Muhammad Hussein Tabatabai is a prominent philosopher and interpreter of the Qur’an, usually called allama, meaning highly knowledgeable, and mufasiri, meaning the great interpreter of the Qur’an. His masterpiece is his interpretation of the Qur’an, Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, in 20 volumes, that has been repeatedly published in Beirut, Tehran, and Qum in the second half of the twentieth century. A well-known Iranian philosopher, Murtaza Mutahhari, describes Tabatabai’s interpretation of the Qur’an as the greatest interpretation that has been ever written in Islamic history. See Abul Qasim Razzaqi, “Ba Allama-yi Tabatabai dar al-Mizan,” in Yadnami-yi Mufassiri Kabir Ustad Allama-yi Tabatabai (Qum: Intisharati Shafaq, 1982), p. 212. Misbah, an influential thinker in contemporary Iran, describes Tabatabai as the greatest interpreter and philosopher in the contemporary Shiite world.Google Scholar

See Muhammad Taqi Misbah, “Sukhani Piramouni Shakhsiyyati Ustad Allama-yi Tabatabai,” in Yadnami-yi Mufassiri Kabir Ustad Allama-yi Tabatabai (Qum: Intisharati Shafaq, 1982), p. 41. Sobhani, a distinguished philosopher and jurist, argues that Tabatabai has delivered an original style of the interpretation of the Qur’an.Google Scholar

See Jaafar Sobhani, “Nazari wa Gozari bar Zindigani-yi Ustad Allama-yi Tabatabai,” in Yadnami-yi Mufassiri Kabir Ustad Allama-yi Tabatabai (Qum: Intisharati Shafaq, 1982), pp. 70–2. Jawadi Amoli, a prominent Shiite philosopher and interpreter of the Qur’an, argue that in addition to his innovation in the interpretation of the Qur’an, Tabatabai has promoted Islamic philosophy and made a strong attempt to reconcile between the teachings of the Qur’an and Islamic philosophy and mysticism.Google Scholar

See Muhammad Taqi Misbah, “Naqshi Ustad Allama-yi Tabatabai dar Nihzati Fikri-yi Hawzi-yi Ilmiyyi-yi Qum’, in Yadnami-yi Mufassiri Kabir Ustad Allama-yi Tabatabai (Qum: Intisharati Shafaq, 1982), pp. 141–3;Google Scholar

and Abdullah Jawadi-yi Amoli, “Siri-yi Falsafi-yi Ustad Allama-yi Tabatabai,” in Yadnami-yi Mufassiri Kabir Ustad Allama-yi Tabatabai, (Qum: Intisharati Shafaq, 1982), pp. 167–8.Google Scholar

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Ibid., pp. lvii, 132, 144.Google Scholar

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Look for instance at Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 127; Bellamy, Liberalism and ModernSociety, p. 7;CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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Since the concept of toleration implies disagreement and disapproval of what is tolerated, liberal citizens, who are self-restrained towards their disagreeing people, should be appreciated. See Steven Kautz, “Liberalism and the Idea of Toleration,” American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 2 (May 1993): 610. of course, as this book will demonstrate, peaceable religious people are, also, tolerant of those whom they believe to follow false conceptions of the good.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Nick Fotion and Gerard Elfstrom, Toleration (London and Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992), pp. 13, 117, 4.Google Scholar

Mary Warnock, “The Limits of Toleration,” in On Toleration, ed. Susan Mendus and David Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 126–7.Google Scholar

Preston King, Toleration, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. xiii, xiv, 21–29.Google Scholar

Richard C. Sinopoli, “Liberalism and Contested Conceptions of the Good: The Limits of Neutrality,” The journal of Politics 55, no. 3 (August 1993): 644.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Ibid., p. 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Ibid., pp. xxix, 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Iain McLean (ed.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 445.Google Scholar

Bernard Eugene Meland, The Secularisation of Modern Cultures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 4, 15.Google Scholar

Rajeev Bhargava, “Introduction,” in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 3, 7–8.Google Scholar

Veit Bader, “Religious Diversity and Democratic Institutional Pluralism,” Political Theory 31, no. 2 (April 2003): 269–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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Ibid., pp. 169–70.Google Scholar

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Following political theorists such as Joseph Raz and William Galston, this book rejects even the feasibility of constructing a neutral state. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 110–33; and Galston, Liberal Purposes, Goods, Virtues, and Diversity, pp. 79–97.Google Scholar

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As Charles Taylor argues, the solution suggested by Hobbes and Grotius to the problem of religious conflicts rests on the supposition that there is “an independent political ethics.” Whether or not God exists, all human beings understand some ethical codes, which should reign supreme in politics, such as keeping one’s promise. Not only do Hobbes and Grotius propose the availability of a collection of independent political ethics, but to distinguish them from religious ethics they also argue that religion is a private issue. The public sphere, thus, should be exclusively entrusted to independent political ethics. As Taylor expounds, Locke and Pufendrof’s alternative solution to overcome religious conflicts suggests “the common ground strategy” To establish peace among the followers of all sects of Christianity, they searched for some religious, even Christian, principles in which all sects of this religion share.. This solution rests on the idea of Natural Law, which can be discovered by the same reason that brings us to submit to God. See Charles Taylor, “Modes of Secularism,” in Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and Its Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 33–5.Google Scholar

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