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The Evolution of China’s National Interest: Implications for Taiwan

  • Peter R. MoodyJr.

Abstract

Ever since its founding, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has claimed sovereignty over its “sacred territory,” Taiwan. American acknowledgment of this claim, however ambiguously expressed,1 has been a condition for normal relations with the PRC. The assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan is treated as a core Chinese national interest; sovereignty over Taiwan is one aspect of the officially defined Chinese national identity.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Chinese Communist Party Democratic Progressive Party International Politics State Sovereignty 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
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    In his classic discussion of Japanese decision-making in the last days of World War II, Joseph Butow identifies a similar dynamic. All the leaders knew that Japan had lost the war and would have to surrender, but no one dared to say so. Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954). Butow treats this phenomenon as a peculiarity of Japanese culture, but it is probably universal. Compare Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, Alexander C. Tan 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter R. MoodyJr.

There are no affiliations available

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