Abstract
Given the prevalence of bandwagoning rather than balancing, one might think a unipolar system would be one filled with alliances. Deeper reflection, however, reveals that this is not necessarily true Alliances are a tool of balancers, great powers who need to be able to count on one another to block the power of other great powers Alliances are also important for states that fear they will be balanced against—they try to tie other countries to themselves to preclude the other countries from joining the other side. In a unipolar world, however, these are not major concerns for the great power. In the absence of balancing, the unipolar power does not need to tie states to itself The unipolar power also does not need strong allies to meet the weak threats it faces. The unipolar power, like all states, prefers flexibility in pursuit of power. With no need for tight alliances, and a plethora of potential bandwagoners, the unipolar power will assemble temporary coalitions as it needs them, avoiding the tight alliance patterns of the bipolar era. This chapter develops and evaluates a hypothesis regarding alliance patterns in a unipolar system.
Keywords
Rome Statute Major Power Alliance Partner Price Leader Military AlliancePreview
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Chapter 5
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