Abstract
Scientific explanation is verbal behavior. Any attempt to comprehend behaviorism as a philosophy of psychology requires an appreciation of how its practitioners use language. It also requires some familiarity with the ways in which competing systems of explanation use language. For this reason alone, we cannot avoid intentionality. Some behaviorist rebuttals of intentional explanation do not even mention that it inheres above all in a particular form of linguistic usage, even before any ontological questions have been settled. Dennett, for example, is repeatedly cited by behaviorists, though sometimes without understanding of what he said and how it has changed over the decades. It seems essential, therefore, to understand the nature of intentionality and to contrast it with the extensional explanation towards which behaviorism has traditionally striven. For, whatever our aims, if we use intentional language, we are using intentional explanation. Intentional explanation is both in widespread use among behaviorists, and in any cases necessary to a behavioral science approach. Better, therefore, to identify where it is used, perhaps where it needs to be used, than to simply deny it. In particular, I want to address the question: To what extent does intentionality, as well as behaviorism, elucidate the findings of consumer behavior analysis?
Keywords
Discriminative Stimulus Propositional Content Personal Level Radical Behaviorism Private EventPreview
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