Economic Sanctions

  • Mortimer N. S. Sellers
Chapter

Abstract

Economic sanctions have become increasingly common since the end of the Second World War and the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945.1 The lessons of the Second World War, as expressed in the Charter, reflected a new determination among states to avoid armed conflict at almost any cost,2 but also to protect the universal human rights of all persons.3 Signatories to the Charter agreed to settle their disputes by peaceful means,4 to respect the equal rights and self-determination of peoples,5 and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.6 The second and third commitments embodied in the Charter reinforce the first, by supplying the necessary conditions for stable peace and security, but the primary commitment to maintain international peace somewhat limits the others by discouraging recourse to military intervention to protect human rights, national self-determination and other international rights and duties. This leaves economic sanctions as one of the few methods available to enforce international law.

Keywords

Security Council Economic Freedom Fundamental Freedom International Peace United Nations Security Council 
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Notes

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© Mortimer N. S. Sellers 2006

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