Abstract
At least since James I, the struggle for influence has been continuous and so has the struggle to define legitimate sources of influence. The politics of advice thus forms part of the continuous dialogue of government. In America the constitutional separation of powers requires that it is a dialogue conducted between the legislative and executive branch of government, with the judicial branch occasionally being called upon to adjudicate between the two. In Britain, since the nineteenth century, a secret constitutional separation of powers has existed between the permanent government in Whitehall and the transitory government from Westminster.3 In Britain, therefore, it is a dialogue conducted within the executive branch itself.
Keywords
Prime Minister Advisory System Constitutional Rule Electoral Politics Constitutional ChangePreview
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Notes
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