Reconciling Transatlanticism and Multilateralism: Great-Power Management of the World Trading System

  • Richard H. Steinberg
Chapter

Abstract

In 1995, geostrategic demands and trade interests converged to refocus attention on transatlantic trade policy. With the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Seeond World War and imminent plans for expanding NATO, geostrategists searched for trade policy initiatives that would reinforce the US commitment to Europe.2 With fresh memories of ultimately successful European Union-US cooperation in closing the Uruguay Round and an awareness that transatlantic trade differences and rows had almost sunk the Round, trade policy strategists sought new ways to improve transatlantic relations.3 That renewed interest in transatlanticism generated new trade initiatives and agreements between the European Union and the United States, statements of support for extensive transatlantic trade liberalization, and a formal dialogue between business leaders in the United States and Europe intended to generate new government-to-government trade agreements, as well as several new books on transatlantic trade relations.

Keywords

Free Trade Trade Policy Uruguay Round Trade Negotiation Deep Integration 
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References

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Copyright information

© Richard H. Steinberg 1999

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  • Richard H. Steinberg

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