The Lessons of Waziristan, August 1914–October 1925

Abstract

The insistent ‘threat’ posed by Afghanistan and the independent tribes led to the mobilisation and deployment of three infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade in the NWFP, in addition to the normal three frontier brigades and militia, throughout the First World War.¹ However, the quality of these troops steadily declined as the war progressed and highly experienced, long-service, pre-war regular regiments were sent overseas to France, the Middle East and East Africa. Those units that remained were steadily ‘milked’ of officers, NCOs and men, to act as instructors or replace casualties, and soon primarily consisted of reservists and raw recruits of doubtful fighting value. During 1915 the military effectiveness of the border garrisons started to seriously concern the General Staff in India, when unrest spread throughout tribal territory and the remaining regulars in the Field Army were replaced by newly-raised, under-officered and poorly-equipped Indian regiments, Imperial Service Troops and units of the Nepalese Contingent.² The inherent limitations of relying solely on the general principles and six condensed paragraphs on mountain warfare laid down in FSR to govern training were quickly exposed after partially trained TA battalions and new Indian regiments were deployed in the NWFP, whose officers lacked both experience and basic military knowledge.