Regulating Technological Innovation through Informal International Law: The Exercise of International Public Authority by Transnational Actors

  • Ramses A. Wessel
Chapter

Abstract

The relationship between law, innovation and technology has been studied extensively. Almost by nature a warm relationship, it seems inherently contradictory as more law would imply less innovation. Even if we would point to the advantages of regulation for technological innovation, the institutional setting may be too complex to handle. In the words of Roger Brownsword and Han Somsen: ‘In the best of all worlds, the regulatory environment will support and prioritise technological innovation that promises to strengthen the conditions that are essential for human social existence, and it will guard effectively against the abuse of and inherent risks presented by particular lines of technological development. In the real world, however, regulators have limited control over the priorities set by either market or military and there are severe restrictions on what nation states can individually control beyond their geographical borders.’1 The present contribution purports to add to the existing body of literature by focusing on one specific phenomenon, which may complicate the institutional setting even further: informal international law as a tool to regulate technological innovation.

Keywords

Technological Innovation Global Governance Internet Engineer Task Force International Telecommunication Union Legal Subject 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Notes

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© Michiel A. Heldeweg and Evisa Kica 2011

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  • Ramses A. Wessel

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