Cooperative Behaviour and Institutions

  • Arild Vatn
Chapter

Abstract

Economics is shifting away from general equilibrium theory and towards a ‘vision of complexity’. We observe this in the increased interest in an empirically based understanding of how economies work (see Brock and Colander, 2000; Bowles, 2004; Gowdy, 2004). We see it in the changed understanding of human choice following the large number of behavioural experiments published over the last 20–30 years (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Bowles, 1998; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gintis et al., 2005).

Keywords

Intrinsic Motivation Contingent Valuation Cooperative Behaviour Social Dilemma Ultimatum Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aldred, J. (2006), ‘Incommensurability and Monetary Valuation’, Land Economics 82(2), pp. 141–161.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Álvarez-Farizo, B. and Hanley, N. (2006), ‘Improving the Process of Valuing Nonmarket Benefits: Combining Citizens’ Juries with Choice Modelling’, Land Economics 82(3), pp. 465–478.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Andreoni, J. (1990), ‘Impure Altruism and the Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm Glow Giving’, The Economic Journal 100, pp. 467–477.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Baron, J. and Spranca, M. (1997), ‘Protected Values’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 70(1), pp. 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Batson, C. and Shaw, L. (1991), ‘Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives’, Psychological Inquiry 2(2), pp. 107–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Biel, A. and Thøgersen, J. (2007), ‘Activation of Social Norms in Social Dilemmas: A Review of the Evidence and Reflections on the Implications for Environmental Behavior’, Journal of Economic Psychology 28, pp. 93–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Blount, S. (1995), ‘When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process 63(2), pp. 131–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Bohnet, I., Frey, B. and Huck, S. (2001), ‘More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust and Crowding’, American Political Science Review 95(1), pp. 131–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Bowles, S. (1998), ‘Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions’, Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVI (March), pp. 75–111.Google Scholar
  10. Bowles, S. (2004), Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.Google Scholar
  11. Brekke, K., Kverndokk, S. and Nyborg, K. (2003), An Economic Model of Moral Motivation’, Journal of Public Economics 87(9–10), pp. 1967–1983.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Brock, W. and Colander, D. (2000), ‘Complexity and Policy’, in D. Colander (ed.), The Complexity Vision and the Teaching of Economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA, pp. 73–96.Google Scholar
  13. Brouwer, R., Powe, N., Turner, R., Bateman, I. and Langford, I. (1999), ‘Public Attitudes to Contingent Valuation and Public Consultation’, Environmental Values 8, pp. 325–347.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Camerer, C. and Thaler, R. (1995), ‘Anomalies. Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2), pp. 209–219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Davis, D. and Holt, C. (1993), Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.Google Scholar
  16. Deci, E. (1971), ‘Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18, pp. 105–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Deci, E. and Ryan, R. (1985), Intrinsic Motivation and Self Determination in Human Behavior, Plenum Press, New York.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Eek, D., Biel, A. and Gärling, T. (2001), ‘Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas When Equality is Perceived as Unfair’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology 31, pp. 649–666.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Elster, J. (1983), Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  20. Etzioni, A. (1988), The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics, The Free Press, New York.Google Scholar
  21. Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G. and Riedl, A. (1993), ‘Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(2), pp. 437–459.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Fehr, E., Gächter, S. and Kirchsteiger, G. (1997), ‘Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence’, Econometrica 65(4), pp. 833–860.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G. and Riedl, A. (1998), ‘Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets’, European Economic Review 42, pp. 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. (2000), ‘Cooperation and Punishment’, American Economic Review 90, pp. 980–994.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Fehr, E. and Falk, A. (2002), ‘Psychological Foundations of Incentives: Joseph Schumpeter Lecture’, European Economic Review 46, pp. 687–724.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Fehr, E. and Gintis, H. (2007), ‘Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations’, Annual Review of Sociology 33(3), pp. 1–22.Google Scholar
  27. Fiske. P. and Tetlock, P. (1997), ‘Taboo Trade-offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice’, Political Psychology 18(2), pp. 255–297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J., Savin, N. and Sefton, M. (1994), ‘Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments’, Games and Economic Behavior 6, pp. 347–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Frey, B. (1997), Not Just For the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.Google Scholar
  30. Frey, B. and Oberholzer-Gee, F. (1997), ‘The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out’, American Economic Review 87(4), pp. 746–755.Google Scholar
  31. Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J. and Kurki, A. (2004), ‘Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences and an Empirical Test’, Public Choice 119, pp. 91–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Gintis, H. (2000), ‘Beyond Homo Economicus: Evidence from Experimental Economics’, Ecological Economics 35, pp. 311–322.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R. and Fehr, E. (2003), ‘Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans’, Evolution and Human Behavior 24, pp. 153–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R. and Fehr, E. (2005), Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  35. Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A. (2000a), ‘A Fine is a Price’, The Journal of Legal Studies 29, pp. 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A. (2000b), ‘Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3), pp. 791–810.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Gowdy, J. (2004), ‘The Revolution in Welfare Economics and Its Implications for Environmental Valuation and Policy’, Land Economics 80(2), pp. 239–257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Giith, W., Schmittberger, R. and Schwarze, B. (1982), ‘An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, pp. 367–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, B., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H. and McElrath, R. (2001), ‘In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies’, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 91(2), pp. 73–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Hodgson, G. (1988), Economics and Institutions. A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics, Cambridge, Polity Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  41. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K. and Smith, V. (1994), ‘Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games’, Games and Economic Behavior 7, pp. 346–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K. and Smith, V. (1996), ‘Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games’, American Economic Review 86, pp. 653–660.Google Scholar
  43. Holland, A. (1997), ‘Substitutability, or Why Strong Sustainability Is Weak and Absurdly Strong Sustainability Is Not Absurd’, in J. Foster (ed.), Valuing Nature? Economics, Ethics and Environment, Routledge, London, pp. 119–134.Google Scholar
  44. Holt, C., Langan, L. and Villamil, A. (1986), ‘Market Power in Oral Double Auctions’, Economic Inquiry 24, pp. 107–123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Lane, R. (1991), The Market Experience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Ledyard, J. (1995), ‘Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research’, in J. Kagel and A. Roth (eds), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, pp. 111–194.Google Scholar
  47. Mitchell, R. and Carson, R. (1989), Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method, Resources for the Future, Washington DC.Google Scholar
  48. North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Ostrom, E. (1998), ‘A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action’, Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997, American Political Science Review 92(1), pp. 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Ostrom, E. (2000), ‘Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3), pp. 137–158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Pillutla, M. and Chen, X.-P. (1999), ‘Social Norms and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Context and Feedback’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 78(2), pp. 81–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Renn, O., Webler, T. and Wiedeman, P. (1995), Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation: Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Romp, G. (1997), Game Theory: Introduction and Application, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  54. Ross, L. and Ward, A. (1996), ‘Naïve Realism: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding’, in E. Reed, E. Turiel and T. Brown (eds), Values and Knowledge, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, pp. 103–135.Google Scholar
  55. Roth, A., Prasnikar, V., Okuna-Fujiwara, M. and Zamir, S. (1991), ‘Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburg and Tokyo: an Experimental Study’, American Economic Review 81, pp. 1068–1095.Google Scholar
  56. Sagoff, M. (1988), The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law and Environment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  57. Screpanti, E. (1995), ‘Relative Rationality, Institutions and Precautionary Behaviour’, in J. Groenewegen, C. Pitelis and S. Sjöstrand (eds), On Economic Institutions — Theory and Applications, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 63–84.Google Scholar
  58. Schulze, G. and Frank, B. (2003), ‘Deterrence Versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility’, Economics of Governance 4(2), pp. 143–160.Google Scholar
  59. Sen, A. (1977), ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 6(4), pp. 317–344.Google Scholar
  60. Shogren, J. (2006), ‘A Rule of One’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 88(4), pp. 1147–1159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. Slovic, P. and Lichtenstein, S. (1983), ‘Preference Reversals: A Broader Perspective’, American Economic Review 73, pp. 596–605.Google Scholar
  62. Smith, A. (1759 [1976]), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Edited by E. Cannan, Methuen, London.Google Scholar
  63. Smith, A. (1776 [1976]), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
  64. Sober, E. and Wilson, D. (1998), Onto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  65. Spash, C. (2000), ‘Multiple Value Expression in Contingent Valuation: Economics and Ethics’, Environmental Science Technology 34, pp. 1433–1438.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  66. Spash, C. (2006), ‘Non-Economic Motivation for Contingent Values: Rights and Attitudinal Beliefs in the Willingness to Pay for Environmental Improvements’, Land Economics 82(4), pp. 602–622.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Stagl, S. (2006), ‘Multicriteria Evaluation and Public Participation: The Case of UK Energy Policy’, Land Use Policy 23, pp. 53–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  68. Tancredi, L. (2005), Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals About Morality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  69. Tetlock, P. (2000), ‘Coping with Trade-offs: Psychological Constraints and Political Implications’, in A. Lupia, M. McCubbins and S. Popkin (eds), Elements of Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 237–262.Google Scholar
  70. Titmus, R. (1971), The Gift of Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, Pantheon Books, New York.Google Scholar
  71. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1986), ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’, in R. Hogarth and M. Reder (eds), Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
  72. Thøgersen, J. (1994), ‘Monetary Incentives and Environmental Concern: Effects of a Differentiated Garbage Fee’, Journal of Consumer Policy 17(4), pp. 407–442.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  73. Vatn, A. (2004), ‘Valuation and Rationality’, Land Economics 80(February), pp. 1–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  74. Vatn, A. (2005), Institutions and the Environment, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.Google Scholar
  75. Vatn, A. and Bromley, D. (1994), ‘Choices without Prices without Apologies’, Journal for Environmental Economics and Management 26, pp. 129–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  76. Verplanken, B. (2005), ‘Habits and Implementation Intentions’, in J. Kerr, R. Weitkunat and M. Moretti (eds), The ABC of Behavioural Change, Elsevier Science, Oxford, pp. 99–109.Google Scholar
  77. Walzer, M. (1983), Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, Basic Books, New York.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Arild Vatn 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arild Vatn

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations