The Normative in Perception

  • Steven Crowell
Chapter

Abstract

Suppose I tell a friend that the rose bush on my front porch is in bloom. If he wonders how I know such a thing, I might respond that I saw it as I left for work this morning. If pressed, I might invite my friend home so he can see the bush for himself. What is supposed to be served by my report of what I saw? It is supposed to provide justification for what I say by grounding it in what I see. But what does ‘grounding’ mean here? My claim about the rose bush is a claim about an entity in the world, and I assume that looking at such an entity warrants the claim, that perceiving it underwrites the truth of what I say. Sceptics have often questioned this assumption, pointing out that perception can be deceptive in many ways; indeed, we may have no good reason for holding that any perception delivers the world as it is. When I make a judgement, the object about which I judge becomes a standard against which the judgement may be measured: if the object is as I say it is, then my judgement is true (i.e., does what it is supposed to do as this judgement); if not, not.

Keywords

Perceptual Experience Sensory Field Intentional Content Perceptual Content Conceptual Capacity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© Steven Crowell 2012

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  • Steven Crowell

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