Ghosts in the World Machine? Humility and Its Alternatives

  • Rae Langton
  • Christopher Robichaud
Chapter
Part of the New Waves in Philosophy book series (NWIP)

Abstract

At the heart of being lies a mystery, according to Kant: we have ‘no insight whatsoever into the intrinsic nature of things.’ Some people complain, but their complaints are misguided.

If the complaints that ‘we have no insight whatsoever into the intrinsic nature of things’ are supposed to mean that we cannot grasp by pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, they are completely unreasonable and stupid. What is wanted is that we should to be able to be acquainted with things without senses! (Kant 1781/1787, A277/B333)

Keywords

Intrinsic Property Fundamental Property Causal Power Categorical Property Intrinsic Nature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© Rae Langton and Christopher Robichaud 2010

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  • Rae Langton
  • Christopher Robichaud

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