Conflict in the Caucasus pp 1-7 | Cite as
Introduction
Abstract
On 7 August 2008, long-standing tensions in the Caucasus region came to a head when President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia ordered troops into the de facto independent region of South Ossetia with a view to reestablishing Georgian sovereignty. This intervention, which included the shelling and occupation of the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, was the culmination of a number of more minor military exchanges over the proceeding months. South Ossetia’s sponsor, the Russian Federation, responded swiftly to the Georgian action, with a large-scale military intervention into the state of Georgia. This use of force ultimately went beyond the boundaries of the South Ossetia region, both into the comparable breakaway region of Abkhazia and further into ‘Georgia proper’.
Keywords
United Nations Supra Note International Order International Legal Order Ceasefire AgreementPreview
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Notes
- 5.5. See, for example, C. Henderson and J.A. Green (2010) ‘The Jus ad Bellum and Entities Short of Statehood in the Report on the Conflict in Georgia’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 59, 129–139.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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- 10.10. See, for example, R. Teitel (2002) ‘Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics’, Cornell International Law Journal, 35, 355.Google Scholar
- 12.12. A. Hurrell (2000) ‘International Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society’ in M. Byers (ed.) The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.334.Google Scholar
- 13.13. S. Chesterman (2008) ‘An International Rule of Law’, American Journal of Comparative Law, 56, 342. It should be noted that Chesterman’s ‘functional’ approach to the rule of law and its connection to world order is not unique. See, for example, the manner in which Richard Falk has applied these concepts in R.A. Falk (2008) The Costs of War: International Law, The UN and World Order (Abingdon: Routledge).CrossRefGoogle Scholar