Perspectives on Legislative Budgeting

Abstract

The comparative study of political institutions has a venerable tradition in political science (Lijphart 1984, 1999; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Tsebelis 2002). Economists, too, have become increasingly interested in the policy effects of political institutions (for an overview, see Congleton and Swedenborg 2006a). Much of the focus in this literature is on fundamental constitutional choices, such as presidential versus parliamentary regimes, federal versus unitary states and proportional versus majoritarian electoral systems. For instance, Weaver and Rockman (1993: 10) regard the choice between presidential or parliamentary government as most fundamental for government performance. Similarly, Persson and Tabellini’s (2003) widely discussed study of the economic effects of constitutions finds that presidentialism and plurality rule electoral systems result in lower levels of central government expenditure compared with parliamentary regimes and proportional representation electoral formulas.