Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume

Abstract

David Hume is often taken to be a moral expressivist (Flew, 1963; Ayer, 1980, pp. 84–5; Price, 1988, p. 6; Snare, 1991; Harman, 1996, p. 97). He is, moreover, often taken to have presented in the Treatise one of the strongest arguments for moral expressivism: the so-called Motivation Argument. As a metaethicist, I am interested in whether expressivism is true, and thus interested in whether the argument that people think they find in Hume is a sound one. Not being a Hume scholar (but merely a devoted fan), I am less interested in whether Hume really was an expressivist or whether he really did present an argument in its favour. Hume’s metaethical views are very difficult to nail down, and by a careful selection of quotes one can present him as advocating expressivism, or cognitivist subjectivism, or moral scepticism, or a dispositional theory, or an ideal observer theory, or even utilitarianism. It is entirely possible that Hume’s position is indeterminate when considered against these terms of modern moral philosophy; it is also entirely possible that he was hopelessly confused (much as it pains me to admit it). However, I doubt very much that Hume should be interpreted as an expressivist in any straightforward manner, and therefore I am doubtful that he should be interpreted as arguing in its favour. Most of this essay does not discuss Hume directly at all: I critically discuss the Motivation Argument and I advocate a certain positive metaethical view — one that mixes elements of traditional expressivism with elements of cognitivism.