Game Theory pp 256-262 | Cite as

Nash program

  • Steven N. Durlauf
  • Lawrence E. Blume
Chapter
Part of the The New Palgrave Economics Collection book series (NPHE)

Abstract

In game theory, ‘Nash program’ is the name given to a research agenda, initiated in Nash (1953), intended to bridge the gap between the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to the discipline.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Pareto Frontier Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoff Vector Bargaining Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steven N. Durlauf
    • 1
  • Lawrence E. Blume
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Wisconsin-MadisonUSA
  2. 2.Cornell UniversityUSA

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