Self-Defense in International Relations

Shirley V. Scott, “International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and International Politics,” European Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 313–325.Google Scholar

Richard A. Falk, “The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of International Law: An Intermediate View” in Karl Deutsch and Stanley Hoffman (eds), The Relevance of International Law (Schenkman Publishing Company: 1968), p. 142.Google Scholar

Also see, James P. Piscatori, “The Contribution of International Law to International Relations,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–), Vol. 53, No. 2, April 1977, pp. 217–231;Google Scholar

Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulmello and Stepan Wood, “International Law and International Relation Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 92, No. 3, Jul. 1998, pp. 367–397;CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kenneth W. Abott, “Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers,” Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, 1989, pp. 335–411; Harold H. Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” 106 Yale Law Journal, 1997, pp. 2599–2604, pp. 2632–2659;Google Scholar

Keohane, Robert O. (1997) “International Relations and International Law: Two Optics,” Harvard International Law Journal, 38, 487–502;Google Scholar

Coplin, William (1965) “International law and Assumptions about the State System,” World Politics, 17, 615–634;CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Beck, Robert J. (1996) “International Law and International Relations: The Prospects of Interdisciplinary Collaboration” in Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend, and Robert D. Vander Lugt (eds) International Rules. Approaches from International Law and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 3–33.Google Scholar

Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition (Published for the Council of Foreign Relations: Columbia University Press, 1979). Henkin argues “in relations between nations, the progress of civilization may be seen as movement from force to diplomacy, from diplomacy to law” (page 1).Google Scholar

Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, No. 2. Apr. 1993, p. 205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

William D. Coplin, “International Law and Assumptions About the State System,” World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1965, pp. 615–634, p. 633.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Glenn H. Snyder, 1988, “Deterrence and Defense” in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds) The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, Third Edition, University Press of America (Lanham, New York, London), pp. 25–43, p. 25. Deterrence, defined by Snyder is “discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing its prospective gain,” ibid. p. 25.Google Scholar

Benjamin R. Barber, Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy (New York & London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), p. 108.Google Scholar

Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, “Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order,” International Studies Perspectives, 4, No. 4 (November 2003), p. 388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 40.Google Scholar

Dan Reiter, “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen,” International Security, 20, No. 2 (Autumn 1995), pp. 6–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 123.Google Scholar

See Pitman B. Potter, 1951, “Editorial Comment: Preventive War Critically Considered,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 45, No. 1. (Jan., 1951), pp. 142–145CrossRefGoogle Scholar

and Jack S. Levy, 1987, “Research Note: Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Oct., 1987), pp. 82–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

On April 14, 1986, Ronald Reagan asserted on national TV that self-defense “is not only our right, it is our duty.” This was following the bombing by the United States against the “terrorist facilities” in Libya. See Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 138.Google Scholar

According to Robert Pauly and Tom Lansford, The Bush Administration’s NSS 2002 has its strengths and weaknesses that need to be acknowledged. The strengths of the Bush NSS lie at the level of US security and foreign policy while the weaknesses primarily rest in the domain of the international or collective. First, it lays down the centrality of the “war on terror” for US national security for which it suggests a range of economic, political and military tools. Avoiding any diplomatic ambiguities, the Bush NSS lays down a firm direction and a strategic vision for the US. Second, the Bush NSS of 2002 clearly embraces the doctrine of preemption, even prevention to safeguard its national security and interests. This adjustment may be viewed as strength owing to the events of 9/11. Third, Bush administrations NSS elucidates its willingness to attempt a balance between multilateral and unilateral action in its “war against terror.” The NSS Report clearly spells out its will to act “multilaterally whenever possible” and “unilaterally only if absolutely necessary.” Fourth, Bush’s NSS combines soft as well as hard security issues and makes a conscious effort to use the language of international legal norms to justify its controversial stand regarding the doctrine of preemption. By doing so, the US poses as the wolf wrapped in sheep’s clothing. It convinces other states and international organizations, like the UN, of its “good” intentions towards respecting and maintaining international law and order while leaving open the possibility of pursuing its own interests at the expense of law. In terms of weaknesses, first, the Bush NSS 2002 seems ethnocentric. That the US allies would be willing to “defend, preserve and extend peace under American auspices” was a flawed assumption. Allies and adversaries alike now exist in a post cold war world with the United States in a hegemonic position as the world’s sole remaining superpower. There is no way that these powers could prevent the United States from doing what it takes to safeguard its own national interests, even if these were at the expense of other states interests. Second, Bush’s NSS does not fully acknowledge the differing priorities of countries (i.e. environmental politics being a high priority in many Western European capitals). “This could foster serious discord in transatlantic relations in the short term and perhaps, over the long term as well.” See Robert Pauly and Tom Lansford, Strategic Preemption: US Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 49–53.Google Scholar

Howard Adelman, Law, Ethics and Preemption: The Case of Iraq, A Draft paper for presenting at the Socratic Forum at Parliament House in Brisbane, Australia, December 1, 2003 held under the auspices of the Key Center for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance, Griffith University. pp. 1–9, p. 1. www.gu.edu.au/centre/kceljag/adelman.pdf Google Scholar