The Roots of Mindblindness

Abstract

This chapter challenges the hypothesis that the type of social impairment observed in children with autism is evidence of a specific underlying malfunction in a ‘theory of mind mechanism’, resulting in ‘mindblindness’. To establish this point, the chapter takes up two interesting ideas in the ‘Theory of Mind’ literature, but purged of their Cartesianism: first that the study of autism does indeed provide us with critical insights into the development of social understanding and empathy. And second, that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between a child’s interpersonal and intrapersonal development. The chapter seeks to show how the ability to understand someone else’s thoughts and emotions is a product of countless co-regulated interactions with a caregiver in which develop the child’s own emotions and sense of self, as well as her understanding of what others are thinking and feeling, what they believe or intend to do. One of the reasons why children with autism so frequently exhibit impaired social relatedness is because basic biological challenges — such as sensory over- and under-reactivity, social motivation and attentional failures — inhibit their ability to engage in these co-regulated interactive experiences across the developmental landscape.