Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management

Abstract

The creation of ESDP, made possible by a sea-change in British foreign policy that was informed both by the conflicts in the Balkans and the end of the Cold War, led to a further institutionalization of not only foreign but also security and defence policy. This institutionalization was to lead to gradual acceptance for ESDP to be deployed in theatre — and in theatres beyond the Balkans. Member state consensus was that ‘ESDP was born in the Balkans’ and the Balkans, provided that a prior agreement with NATO could be arrived at, constituted a natural theatre for the EU to act in foreign, security and defence policy. Deployment beyond the Balkans, however, was met with nervousness about moving too soon on the part of some member states. This is evident from member state reluctance to lend political approval, let alone military contributions, to Operation Artemis in 2003 — with one member state stating that not only was ESDP ‘born in the Balkans — it should stay in the Balkans’. Apart from the nervousness about moving too soon, conflicting views on the applicability of both CFSP and ESDP instruments also show that the purpose of having ESDP had not quite been worked out on the part of the member states. Reactions towards the two crises in 2001 — FYROM and Afghanistan — in particular crystallized conflicting pressures acting on member states, and show the extent to which they had to re-evaluate their stance not just vis-à-vis CFSP/ESDP but also the EU’s relationship with NATO and the US.