ZANU-PF and MDC Power-Sharing: Zimbabwe Still at a Crossroads?
Chapter
Abstract
For nine years Zimbabwe descended into an abyss of a political-cum-economic crisis. This led to a gradual decline of the economy, political polarization, and the disintegration of the state. During all this time, neither loud diplomacy by the West, nor “quiet” diplomacy by African states could lead Zimbabwe out of the conflict. With the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) factions in September 2008, Zimbabwe finally edged closer to finding the long-elusive political settlement and a formula for establishing a new political and economic dispensation. Four months earlier Zimbabwe had witnessed relatively free and fair elections for the first time in many years, only for the situation to degenerate again into an orgy of political violence and intolerance in the run-up to the presidential runoff elections in June 2008.
Keywords
Presidential Election Southern African Development Community African Union Peace Process Constitutional Amendment
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Notes
- 1.See I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). The transition from conflict and mistrust to peace and mutual trust happens when effective mediation happens at a moment ripe for resolution. One key ingredient of ripeness is that conflict begins to hurt the core interests and resources of the parties to the conflict; the other is when unilateral means of exiting conflict, either suppression or resistance, are blocked and parties feel they are in a costly and uncomfortable predicament. So, realizing or even catalyzing the ripeness of time for conflict resolution is the basic essence of diplomacy because good diplomacy is about doing the right thing at the right time. The underlying assumption is that parties in conflict are rational actors who, when their unilateral pursuit of satisfactory results is blocked, seek alternative ways out of the impasse. Mediation, arbitration, and other diplomatic interventions are attractive alternatives to perpetual and mutually hurting stalemate and conflict. In this perspective, a skilful mediator is able to persuade parties that time is ripe for negotiated settlement by demonstrating the stalemate is hurting the strategic interests of the parties or their key constituencies.Google Scholar
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© Hany Besada 2011