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Conclusion

  • Lai-Ha Chan
Chapter
  • 81 Downloads
Part of the Palgrave Series on Asian Governance book series (PSAG)

Abstract

This study arose from China’s puzzling engagement with global governance in general and with global health governance in particular. Two issues are at the forefront. First, conventional wisdom has claimed that China did not address its looming HIV/AIDS problem until the devastating SARS crisis of 2002–3. China’s response to its ailing public health governance is seen as a reactive rather than proactive action to a full-blown crisis. However, this research demonstrates that was not the case. It finds that China’s HIV/AIDS policy began to shift well before the shocking SARS outbreak, with June 2001 being the watershed moment of China’s HIV/AIDS policy, when the central government openly admitted the problem of the pandemic inside the country. Hence, several questions have emerged: why did the Chinese government initiate tackling HIV/AIDS after covering it up for more than fifteen years? Since then, why has it used a multilateral approach to deal with it? What is the nature of its multilateral approach? How does China’s record of compliance or noncompliance with the international health regime reveal the reasons for and limitations of its participation in global governance?

Keywords

Global Governance World Order International Order National Sovereignty Global Public Good 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

  1. 1.
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    Yong Deng has argued that China’s post-cold war foreign policy is mainly driven by its quest for great-power status. See Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    In studying China’s behavior in the WTO, Margaret Pearson and Gerald Chan have also concluded that China is far from revisionist. It is a follower rather than a leader. It could join collective efforts initiated and led by the third world, such as the Group of 21, but has never involved itself in a leadership role in shepherding its development. For the most part, it has been acting as a system-maintainer. The only exception to this is on those issues seen to impinge on its national sovereignty and dignity. See Margaret M. Pearson, “China in Geneva: Lessons from China’s Early Years in the World Trade Organization,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 242Google Scholar
  9. Gerald Chan, China’s Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, Human Rights (New Jersey: World Scientific, 2006), 218.Google Scholar
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    Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).Google Scholar
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© Lai-Ha Chan 2011

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  • Lai-Ha Chan

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