Theorizing and Extrapolating China’s Increased Participation in Global Health Governance

  • Lai-Ha Chan
Part of the Palgrave Series on Asian Governance book series (PSAG)


Previous chapters have presented the ways in which China has fought the HIV/AIDS pandemic through multi-lateral cooperation both at home and abroad. China’s engagement with the health regime in dealing with the disease has had mixed results. With increasing economic, political, and normative clout, whether China would comply with the Western norms and rules without any qualification is a crucial question. Against this background, this chapter primarily addresses two questions. First, why did China change its stance at the turn of the century and has since then increased its participation in global health governance? Second, what does China’s record of compliance and non-compliance with the international health regime and its activities in both the WHO and WTO reveal about its preferences for the world order?


Global Governance Asian Development Bank Soft Power Chinese Leader National Sovereignty 
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