“China Rising” and Its Implications for North Korea’s China Policy

  • David C. Kang
Chapter

Abstract

Since the introduction of market reforms in 1978, China has rapidly emerged as a major regional and even global power, averaging over 9 percent economic growth over the next thirty years. Although China’s economy in 1980 was less than 10 percent the size of the United States’ economy, by 2006 it had grown to almost half that of the United States and surpassed that of Japan when measured by consumption. Foreign businesses have flocked to invest in China, while Chinese exports have begun to flood world markets. China is modernizing its military, has joined numerous regional and international institutions, and is increasingly visible in international politics.

Keywords

Foreign Policy United Nations Korean Peninsula Nuclear Weapon International Security 
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Notes

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Copyright information

© Kyung-Ae Park 2010

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  • David C. Kang

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