Economic Development Takings as Government Failure

  • Ilya Somin
Chapter

Abstract

In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith famously argued that decentralized market transactions generate wealth “by an invisible hand” (Smith 197 6) and that they usually achieve this end better than direct governmental efforts to control the allocation of resources. Takings for “economic development” are based on the exact opposite assumption: that resources will often fail to generate as much wealth as they should unless their allocation is controlled by the visible hand of the state. Unfortunately, the visible hand of eminent domain often destroys as much wealth as it creates and too easily becomes a grasping hand serving the interests of the politically powerful at the expense of the targeted weak.

Keywords

Economic Benefit Private Party Government Failure Public Purpose Eminent Domain 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© The Independent Institute 2010

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  • Ilya Somin

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