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Dementia, Advance Directives, and the Problem of Temporal Selfishness

  • Ryan W. Davis
Chapter
Part of the Jepson Studies in Leadership book series (JSL)

Abstract

Ryan Davis addresses questions related to the prospect of becoming disabled in the future. Davis discusses both cognitive disabilities, such as dementia and physical disabilities. Regarding dementia, Davis argues that the reasons that inform how people with dementia are treated resemble other cases where people’s plans for their lives are informed by conflicting, seemingly irreconcilable considerations. In these cases, it is a mistake, Davis argues, to value one’s current interests or values over the values she will have in the future. Instead, Davis suggests that people should allow more flexibility for their future selves to decide based on their values. Davis writes, “it is easy to demand too much consistency from one’s own values,” but instead people who are considering their future selves should be open to a range value shifts and plot twists as the stories of their lives unfold.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ryan W. Davis
    • 1
  1. 1.Brigham Young UniversityProvoUSA

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