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Kantian Ethics, Well-Being, and Disability

  • Jessica Flanigan
Chapter
Part of the Jepson Studies in Leadership book series (JSL)

Abstract

Jessica Flanigan defends a broadly Kantian approach to disability and disability rights that also emphasizes the importance of considering disabled people’s experiences. Flanigan begins with the claim that it is a mistake to define disabilities with reference to a theory of well-being because whether a person has the physical conditions associated with disability is a separate question from whether it is bad to have those conditions. She then makes the case whatever the relationship between physical disability and well-being, physical ability status as such should rarely influence how people treat each other or the kinds of people that are created. Throughout, Flanigan emphasizes the importance of deferring to people’s testimony about how they experience physical disability rather than settling questions about disability rights and procreative ethics based on theoretical assumptions about the relationship between physical disability and well-being.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jessica Flanigan
    • 1
  1. 1.Jepson School of Leadership StudiesUniversity of RichmondRichmondUSA

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