Disability, Well-Being, and (In)Apt Emotions

  • Dana Howard
Part of the Jepson Studies in Leadership book series (JSL)


Dana Howard addresses whether some emotional responses toward disabled, which are stigmatizing and potentially unwarranted, assume a controversial understanding of disability. Certain conceptions of disability express or reinforce harmful stereotypes of disabled people, cause mistreatment, and make people with disabilities feel isolated or misunderstood. Howard then discusses whether these considerations are the wrong kinds of reasons to inform a conception of disability. Howard replies that these considerations should inform our conceptions of disability, not because certain attitudes toward disability have bad consequences but because they misrepresent disabled people’s experiences.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dana Howard
    • 1
  1. 1.Clinical Center Department of BioethicsNational Institutes of HealthBethesdaUSA

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