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The Primary Effects of Secondary Rules: Institutions and Multi-level Governance

  • Charlotte Ku
  • Paul F. Diehl
Chapter

Abstract

Ku and Diehl’s chapter broadens the traditional conception of secondary rules, defining the international legal system as composed of operating and normative subsystems respectively. Three sets of mechanisms by which secondary rules influence primary rules are examined: (1) configuring institutional frameworks, (2) enhancing the credible commitment of new primary rules, and (3) institutions directly or indirectly making normative law. The conclusions are that secondary rules play important roles in each of these areas. A consistent theme is that the operating system can reduce uncertainty and fill gaps in the existing governance structures. There, secondary rules promote efficiency and coherence in the law. There are, however, instances in which such rules complicate matters, as in several cases lawmaking might be stifled and governance not promoted.

Keywords

United Nations International Criminal Court United Nations Security Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Civil Aviation Organization 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of LawTexas A&M UniversityFort WorthUSA
  2. 2.Political ScienceUniversity of Texas-DallasRichardsonUSA

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