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Mass–Elite Congruence and Representation in Argentina

  • Noam Lupu
  • Zach Warner
Chapter

Abstract

In representative democracies, policymakers should reflect the policy preferences of citizens (Manin 1997; Pitkin 1967). Scholars have long assumed that citizens elect representatives whose platforms are closest to their own preferences (e.g., Downs 1957). And models of accountability assume that elites have incentives not to stray too far from the preferences of sanctioning voters (e.g., Ferejohn 1986). But how close are politicians’ preferences to those of their constituents? Do they indeed reflect an aggregation of citizens’ preferences, or do they prioritize some citizens over others?

Keywords

Electoral System Civil Liberty Party System Executive Branch Representative Democracy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Noam Lupu
    • 1
  • Zach Warner
    • 2
  1. 1.Vanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA
  2. 2.University of Wisconsin-MadisonMadisonUSA

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