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Varieties of Virtue Ethics

  • Robert C. RobertsEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

Virtue ethics has been diverse in several ways, offering divergent lists of virtues, presupposing different metaphysical backgrounds, especially of fundamental anthropology, understanding differently the relation between the virtues and emotions, having divergent understandings of the broad conceptual structure of morality, some being aretaically monistic while others are pluralistic. Others offer monisms that make some dimension of the moral life other than virtue fundamental, and derive their concept of virtue from this other single foundation. And finally, the purpose of the activity of virtue ethics can be variously conceived.

Keywords

Human Nature Virtue Ethic Moral Fact Cardinal Virtue Human Excellence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentBaylor UniversityWacoUSA
  2. 2.University of BirminghamBirminghamUK

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