Qualifying and Quantifying the Greek Structural Reform Efforts

  • Alessio Terzi
Chapter

Abstract

From a growth standpoint, both the first and the second Greek macroeconomic adjustment programme have not delivered anywhere close to a satisfactory outcome. There are differences of opinion, however, over the causes of this failure. This chapter presents a novel quantitative analysis of the structural reform envelope of the Greek programmes. The data corroborates past survey-based evidence suggesting that implementation was broadly on track in the early stages of the first Greek programme. However, the latter was not focussed enough on short- and medium-term growth-enhancing reforms. This initial design failure was corrected in the second Greek programme at which time, however, implementation slipped amid a biting recession and political instability. Concluding that the Greek programmes failed only or mostly because reforms were not implemented would be unfair to the Greek authorities.

Keywords

Structural Reform Adjustment Programme Fiscal Consolidation Reform Measure Labour Market Reform 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alessio Terzi
    • 1
  1. 1.BruegelBrusselsBelgium

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