SALT, Parity and the Critique of MAD

  • Lawrence FreedmanEmail author
  • Jeffrey Michaels


When Nixon was first briefed on the strategic nuclear balance, he was quite taken aback by the extent to which Soviet capabilities had improved since the Cuban missile crisis. Whereas at that time, the US had a ‘five-to-one’ advantage in missiles, by early 1969 the amount of damage each side could inflict was roughly equal, a development Nixon referred to as an ‘astounding change’. Afterwards, Nixon would often compare the nuclear balance at the time he came to office with that which existed in 1962.

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of War StudiesKing’s College LondonLondonUK
  2. 2.Department of Defence StudiesKing’s College LondonLondonUK

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