Introduction: Vertical Relations in Science, Philosophy, and the World: Understanding the New Debates over Verticality1

  • Kenneth Aizawa
  • Carl Gillett
Chapter
First Online:
Part of the New Directions in the Philosophy of Science book series (NDPS)

Abstract

This chapter critiques the new mechanistic explanatory program on grounds that, even when applied to the kinds of examples that it was originally designed to treat, it does not distinguish correct explanations from those that blunder. First, I offer a systematization of the explanatory account, one according to which explanations are mechanistic models that satisfy three desiderata: they must (1) represent causal relations, (2) describe the proper parts, and (3) depict the system at the right “level.” Second, I argue that even the most developed attempts to fulfill these desiderata fall short by failing to appropriately constrain explanatorily apt mechanistic models.

Keywords

Mechanistic Explanation Scientific Explanation Good Account Research Tradition Local Account 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kenneth Aizawa
    • 1
  • Carl Gillett
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyRutgers UniversityNJUSA
  2. 2.Northern Illinois UniversityILUSA

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