Globalisation and the Tax Nomad

  • William Vlcek
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


Vlcek provides the central argument for the book and situates it as an issue of global financial governance with popular media traction. Widely viewed as a problem created by globalisation, nonetheless, it is felt that individuals and firms should pay their ‘fair share’ of taxes. This situation is illuminated with the story of Libussa of Bohemia for the relationship of taxation to state control. Vlcek acknowledges that different methods are used to pursue wealthy individuals as compared to multinational corporations, and both forms of tax nomad are considered in parallel throughout the book.


European Union Internal Revenue Service Secrecy Jurisdiction Individual Taxpayer 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • William Vlcek
    • 1
  1. 1.School of International RelationsUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsUK

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