Social Reality, Law, and Justice

  • David Koepsell


Reality is composed of many layers, including what John Searle calls “brute facts” and, superimposed on these, what he calls “social reality”. Ontology is the study of reality in its various layers, and involves attempts to describe that reality in ways that are useful and logically consistent. Philosophers and others who attempt to “build” ontologies, must examine the manners in which we can best describe objects, and devise structured vocabularies that can be used consistently, often across disciplines, and now with an eye toward automation such that when people use terms to describe reality, a greater consistency, and thus better understanding, ensues. Any object of intentionality is capable of ontological analysis and greater clarity. Abstract objects composed by collective intentionality, such as the institutions and other objects that comprise “social reality”, are especially rich domains for ontological analysis, and the rewards for devising structured vocabularies that suit such objects are potentially great. Because social objects are typically abstract, and often created through vague and historical processes, their contours may be ill-defined, poorly understood, or even inconsistent or illogical.


Social Reality Legal Rule Social Object Brute Fact Legal Positivism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Comision Nacional de Bioetica & Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, XochimilcoXochimilcoMexico

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