EU Trade Policy Reaction to the BIC: From Accommodation to Entrenchment
Chapter
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Abstract
The authors offer an analysis of the EU’s response to the transformation of the international trade regime that became patently clear at the 2003 Cancún Summit of the World Trade Organisation, where emerging powers challenged an EU–US pre-agreement on agriculture. The failure of Cancún marked the end of a governance system dominated by Western powers and highlighted the emergence of Brazil, India and China (the so-called BIC) as trade powers. On the bases of the analytical framework of the volume, the chapter explores the EU trade policy reaction to this context of growing multipolarity in terms of accommodation and entrenchment and puts forward an interpretation of the results.
Keywords
World Trade Organization Veto Player Bilateral Agreement Bilateral Negotiation Multilateral Negotiation
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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