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Analysis

  • Patrick F. Walsh
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter explores some of the failures of past assessments of bio-threats and risks, but the focus is more on the future. In particular, it provides a comprehensive summary of what other discipline and methodological perspectives may improve the assessments of emerging bio-threats and risks. The chapter also grapples with workforces challenges. In other words, are our current analysts fit for purpose to work on bio-threats and risks and how do we ensure they are?

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Patrick F. Walsh
    • 1
  1. 1.Australian Graduate School of Policing and SecurityCharles Sturt UniversityManlyAustralia

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