F. A. Hayek pp 227-256 | Cite as

Hayek, Epistemics, Institutions, and Change

  • Peter J. Boettke
Part of the Great Thinkers in Economics book series (GTE)


In order to understand Hayek’s intellectual journey, one must appreciate his formation in Vienna during the early twentieth century, one of the most vibrant intellectual centers of the time. Hayek was familiar with the debates on the role of epistemology in the natural sciences, and these arguments influenced his own understanding of the scope and method of economics. What the social scientist is always studying is the result of the interaction of the minds of a multitude of individuals. The context within which these minds interact is fundamentally important to trace the basis for the unintended consequences of human action. Hence, epistemic considerations must be at the front and center in our study of economic, political, and social phenomena.


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter J. Boettke
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA
  2. 2.F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics and Economics Mercatus CenterGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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