F. A. Hayek pp 77-118 | Cite as

Hayek on Market Theory and the Price System

  • Peter J. Boettke
Part of the Great Thinkers in Economics book series (GTE)


Hayek’s economics is fundamentally price theoretic. Economy-wide dynamics can only be understood as the result of individual agents, each endowed with dispersed, subjective, and often contradictory knowledge, carrying out their plans according to the information conveyed by the price system. This insight has been extremely influential to the development of economics since the Second World War, especially in the fields of information economics and mechanism design theory. This appropriation of Hayek’s ideas has fallen short of truly incorporating the radical challenge to our understanding of the economic system due to the profession’s focus on formalism, equilibrium analysis, and logical validity. A fully Hayekian economics must place the limits of human knowledge and the coordinating role of institutions at its core.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter J. Boettke
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA
  2. 2.F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics and Economics Mercatus CenterGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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