Skip to main content

Part of the book series: New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science ((NDPCS))

  • 197 Accesses

Abstract

Human activity is permeated by norms of all sorts: moral norms provide the ‘code’ for what we ought to do and how we ought to behave, norms of logic regulate how we reason (or ought to), scientific norms set the standards for what counts as knowledge, legal norms determine what is lawfully permitted and what isn’t, aesthetic norms establish the canon of beauty and thus shape artistic trends and practices, and socio-cultural norms provide the criteria for what counts as tolerable, just, praiseworthy, or unacceptable in a cultural milieu. These and similar phenomena are to a high degree responsible for the structure and configuration of our shared world, which is a multi-faceted normative space that allows or encourages certain behaviors and practices and disallows and discourages others. For this reason, we recognize (more or less consciously) in these norms a certain motivational strength, sometimes even a constraining or prohibitive force, thereby provoking reflections, doubts, and hesitations, feelings of regret or culpability, but also social disapprobation or exclusion in the forms of rejection, denunciation, marginalization, stigmatization, or even punishment.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Anscombe, G.E.M. (1965) Intention (Oxford: Blackwell).

    Google Scholar 

  • Austin, J.L. (1962) Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Benoist, J. (2011) Eléments de philosophie réaliste: réflexions sur ce que l’on a (Paris: Vrin).

    Google Scholar 

  • Bermúdez, J.L. (2001) ‘Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders’, Mind and Language, 16 (5), 457–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bermúdez, J.L. (2003) ‘What is at stake in the debate about nonconceptual content?’, Philosophical Perspectives, 21 (1), 55–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradley, F.H. (1914) Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon).

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandom, R. (1994) Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Brewer, B. (2005) ‘Perceptual experience has conceptual content’ in E. Sosa, M. Steup (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (London: Blackwell), pp. 217–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, A. (2005) ‘Perception and conceptual content’ in E. Sosa, M. Steup (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (London: Blackwell).

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, A., Logue, H. (2009) Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R. (1928/1967) The Logical Structure of the World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Crowell, S. (2013) Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dancy, J. (2000) Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1986) ‘A coherence theory of knowledge and truth’ in E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 307–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Depaul, M., Ramsey, W. (eds) (1998) Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreyfus, H.L. (2014) Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Engel, P. (2007) Va savoir! De la connaissance en général (Paris: Hermann).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. (2005) How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (2007) ‘Philosophical intuitions: their target, their source, and their epistemic status’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74, 1–26

    Google Scholar 

  • Gunther, Y. (ed.) (2003) Essays on Nonconceptual Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gurwitsch, A. (1979) Human Encounters in the Social World (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Haddock, A., Macpherson, F. (eds) (2008) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Heck, R.G. (2007) ‘Are there different kinds of content?’ in J. Cohen, B. McLaughlin (eds), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 117–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hinton, J.M. (1973) Experiences (Oxford: Clarendon).

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1997) Thing and Space (Collected Works, Vol. 7) (Dordrecht: Springer).

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, C. (1996) The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, C. (2008) The Constitution of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer, K. (1990) Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (1987) ‘Singular thought and the extent of inner space’ in J. McDowell, P. Pettit (eds), Subject, Thought, and Context (Oxford: Clarendon).

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (2009) Having the World in View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013) Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge).

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G.E. (1905) ‘The refutation of idealism’ in Selected Writings (T. Baldwin, ed.) (London: Routledge).

    Google Scholar 

  • Noë, A. (2005) Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Noë, A. (2012) Varieties of Presence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Parfit, D. (2011) On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Peacocke, C. (2001) ‘Does perception have a nonconceptual content?’, Journal of Philosophy, 98, 239–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. (2002) Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1918) ‘The relation of sense-data to physics’ in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (London: Longmans, Green and Co.), pp. 145–79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schütz, A., Luckmann, T. (1973) The Structures of the Lifeworld (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1956) ‘Empiricism and the philosophy of mind’, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1 (19), 253–329.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schlick, M. (2009) Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (Vienna: Springler).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Snowdon, P.F. (1979/1980) ‘Perception, vision and causation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81, 175–92.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Travis, C. (2004) ‘The silence of the senses’, Mind, 113 (449), 57–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (2006) ‘Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grain’ in T. Gendler, J. Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 504–30.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (1999) Self-Awareness and Alterity (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 2015 Maxime Doyon and Thiemo Breyer

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Doyon, M., Breyer, T. (2015). Introduction. In: Doyon, M., Breyer, T. (eds) Normativity in Perception. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137377920_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics