Abstract
Public policies frequently involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of ranking alternatives with different populations and population sizes are required.
This chapter is based on a paper presented at the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research Conference on Inequality, Poverty and Human Well-being in Helsinki, May 2003. We thank Conchita D’Ambrosio and two referees for comments and suggestions. Financial support through a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.
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Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., Donaldson, D. (2006). Population Ethics and the Value of Life. In: McGillivray, M. (eds) Inequality, Poverty and Well-being. Studies in Development Economics and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230625594_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230625594_2
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