Abstract
Robert Conquest is best known for his books on the Stalinist terror of the 1930s and the devastating famine in Soviet Ukraine, but he first made his name by analyzing leadership succession and political power in the Soviet Union. In his landmark book on Soviet high politics, Power and Policy in the USSR, Conquest explained how new political leaders emerged and consolidated their power against potential rivals.1 Because no formal arrangements for transferring power existed in the Soviet Union, changes of political leadership were carried out through furtive political struggles and cutthroat maneuvering, which occasionally produced unexpected results. The instability engendered by the lack of institutionalized processes of political succession became evident as early as January 1924 when the death of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Bolsheviks, created a political vacuum. Josif Stalin’s consolidation of power in Moscow through a series of violent moves against his rivals in the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in show trials and executions of former colleagues, underscored the potential role of violence in Soviet leadership struggles.
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Notes
Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR: The Study of Soviet Dynastics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1961).
“O reagirovanii voennosluzhashchikh i vol’nonaemnykh Sovetskoi Armii i Voenno-Morskogo Flota na bolezn’t. I. V. Stalin,” Memorandum (Top Secret) from Kruglov to Georgii Malenkov, Lavrentii Beria, Nikolai Bulganin, and Nikita Khrushchev, March 5, 1953, in Tsentral’nyi Arkhiv Federal’noi Sluzhby Bezopasnosti (TsA FSB), reproduced by Valerii Lazarev in V. A. Kozlov, ed., Neizvestnaya Rosssiya: XX vek, 4 vols. (Moscow: Istoricheskoe nasledie, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 253–258 (quoted portion on pp. 256–257). Lazarev misidentifies Kruglov as the minister for state security, a post actually held at that time by Semyon Ignat’ev.
“Pokhorony Iosifa Vissarionovicha Stalina: Traurnyi miting na Krasnoi ploshchadi 9 marta 1953 goda,” Pravda (Moscow), March 10, 1953, pp. 1–2. Malenkov’s speech was printed in full on page 1. Beria’s and Molotov’s speeches were printed side by side on page 2. All three officials were identified solely by their positions on the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. See also the declassified preparatory documents from the funeral organizing committee, chaired by Khrushchev, in RGASPI, 558/1/1486/148–202; and the account by a senior party official who attended the funeral, Nuriddin Mukhitdinov, Gody, provedennye v Kremle, 3 vols. (Tashkent: Izdatel’stvo Narodnogo Naslediya, 1994), vol. 1 (O deyatel’nost; TsK KPSS i ego Politbyuro v 50-e gody), pp. 87–95.
Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 26–28.
Ibid., pp. 145–163. See also A. V. Pyzhikov, “Poslednie mesyatsy diktatora (1952–1953 gody),” Otechestvennaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 2 (March–April 2002): 152–158.
Elena Zubkova, Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo: Politika i povsednevnost’, 1945–1953 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000). For a valuable collection of declassified documents attesting to the revival of hope, see
E. Yu. Zubkova et al., eds., Sovetskaya zhizn’, 1945–1953 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003).
For a first-rate collection of recently declassified documents from GARF on the uprisings, strikes, and riots in the Gulag in 1953, see vol. 6 (Vosstaniya, bunty i zabastovki zaklyuchennykh, ed. V. A. Kozlov) of V. P. Kozlov et al., eds., Istoriya stalinskogo Gulaga: Konets 1920kh-pervaya polovina 1950kh godov—Sobranie dokumentov, 7 vols. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004), esp. pp. 85–101, 309ff
D. T. Shepilov, “Vospominaniya,” Voprosy istorii (Moscow), No. 8 (August 1998), pp. 11–12.
Khrushchev provides an amusing account of his meeting with Kaganovich: When Kaganovich returned [from Siberia], I requested that he come by the Central Committee headquarters. By the time he got there, it was evening. He and I met for a very long time. He recounted to me in elaborate detail his trip to Siberia and the lumber sites. I did not interrupt him, but I was completely distracted by something very different. Displaying politeness and tact, I waited until he finally paused for breath and was finishing his report to me. When I saw that he had actually stopped speaking, I said to him: “That’s all good what you’ve said, but now I want to tell you what’s going on here.” Quoted from N. S. Khrushchev, “Aktsiya,” in V. F. Nekrasov, eds., Beriya: Konets kar’ery (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), p. 272.
On this point, see V. P. Naumov, “Kistorii sekretnogo doklada N. S. Khrushcheva na XX S’ezda KPSS,” Novaya i noveishaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 4 (July–August 1996): 152–153.
For an extraordinary account of Stalin’s campaign against Molotov and of Beria’s possible role in it, which draws from still-classified materials from Stalin’s personal fond, see Vladimir Pechatnov, “‘Soyuzniki nazhimayut na tebya dlya togo, chtoby slomit’ u tebya volyu …’: Perepiska Stalina s Molotovym i drugimi chlenami Politbyuro na vneshnepoliticheskim voprosam v sentyabre-dekabre 1945 g.,” Istochnik, No. 2 (1999): 70–85, esp. 83. This matter was raised at the July 1953 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee by several speakers; see, for example, “Doklad tov. G. M. Malenkova” and “Rech’ tov. V. A. Malysheva,” both from “Plenum Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS, 2–7 iyulya 1953 g.,” July 1953 (Strictly Secret), in RGANI, 2/1/45/5, 40.
For a very useful discussion of Beria’s changes of personnel at the MVD, based on new archival sources, see Nikita Petrov, Pervyi predsedatel’ KGB Ivan Serov (Moscow: Materik, 2005), pp. 133–140. See also
David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 151–162. Although Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey rely much too heavily and uncritically on the top secret bill of indictment against Beria (a document that is at best tendentious and misleading, and at times flatly inaccurate, as discussed below), their account is illuminating.
V P. Naumov, “Byl li zagovor Berii? Novye dokumenty o sobytiyakh 1953 g.,” Novaya i noveishaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 5 (September–October 1998): p. 23 (emphasis added). My interpretations diverge sharply from Naumov’s on several points, but his article is worth reading. See also his earlier assessment, coauthored with
Aleksandr Korotkov, “Beriya: tainyi i yavnyi,” Moskovskie novosti (Moscow), No. 19 (May 17–24, 1998): 21, which gave a brief, preliminary look at his findings.
Nijolė Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė, ed., Partizanai apie pasaulį, politiką ir save: 1944–1956 m. partizanų spaudos publikacijos (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventoj_u genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimo centras, 1998);
Arvydas Anušauskas, ed., The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States (Vilnius: Du Ka, 1999);
Mart Laar, Zabytaya voina: Dvizhenie vooruzhenogo soprotivleniya v Estonii v 1944–1956 gg. (Moscow: Grenader, 2005);
Yurii Shapoval, OUN i UPA na tereni Polschi, 1944–1947 rr. (Kyiv: Institut Istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, 1997);
David R Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1992); and
Alfred J. Rieber, “Civil Wars in the Soviet Union,” Kritika 4, No. 1 (Winter 2003): 129–162.
These directives were recounted by Vitalii Chernyavskii, who served as the Soviet intelligence station chief in Bucharest in June 1953, in a lengthy interview in 2005. See Leonid Mlechin, “Moi pervyi nachal’nik podpolkovnik Chernyavskii,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (Moscow), No. 26 (July 15, 2005): 7.
See K. S. Moskalenko, “Kak byl arestovan Beriya,” Moskovskie novosti (Moscow), No. 22 (June 10, 1990), pp. 10–11. Moskalenko writes that “after Beria’s arrest, during a routine report to Malenkov, he [Malenkov] happened to tell me and Cde. R. A. Rudenko, the General Procurator, that ‘before turning to K. S. Moskalenko to carry out this operation, we [Malenkov and Khrushchev] approached one of the Marshals of the Soviet Union, but he refused to do it.’ Who this marshal was, Comrade Rudenko and I didn’t ask.” The context suggests that it may have been Aleksandr Vasilevskii, who was then a deputy defense minister. (Vasilevskii and Bulganin alternated as defense minister from 1947 to 1955: Bulganin was minister from 1947 to 1949, Vasilevskii was minister from 1949 to March 1953, and Bulganin returned to the ministerial post in March 1953.) Moskalenko writes that when he suggested bringing Vasilevskii into the operation, Bulganin “for some reason immediately rejected this proposal.”
As with Khrushchev’s memoir, all of the newer firsthand accounts of the Beria affair must be treated with great circumspection. Some of the authors had their own bitter scores to settle, and several who had little or no firsthand knowledge of the plotting were unduly influenced by Khrushchev’s account, which they obviously had seen before writing their own versions. Of particular interest is the portion of Mikoyan’s memoir that deals with the events of late June 1953, “Konets Berii,” Ll. 70–74. Also invaluable are the recollections of several military officers who arrested Beria. See the testimony of Colonel (later General) Ivan Zub in “Zadanie osobogo svoistva: Istoriya i sud’by” (3 parts), Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), March 18, 19, and 20, 1988, pp. 3, 6, and 4, respectively; the recollections of Colonel-General (later Marshal) Kirill Moskalenko in “Kak byl arestovan Beriya” (republished in abridged form in Nekrasov’s book, as cited above); and the brief but interesting account by Marshal Georgii Zhukov, “Riskovannaya operatsiya” (also cited above). In April 1985, before these accounts were published, Zub and two of the other five officers, General Aleksei Baksov and Colonel Viktor Yuferev, wrote a top secret letter to the CPSU Central Committee briefly reviewing the events of June 26, 1953. The letter was declassified in 1992 and published in “Net neobkhodimosti govorit’ o nashikh boevykh zaslugakh …,” Rodina (Moscow), No. 10 (November 1992): 64. Other firsthand observations well worth consulting are Shepilov, “Vospominaniya,” pp. 3–20; Mukhitdinov, Gody, provedennye v kremle, pp. 95–119; Mátyás Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések (Budapest: Napvilag, 1997), pp. 437–478; and the comments by Molotov recorded in Chuev, ed., Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, pp. 335–336. Unfortunately, the relevant section of Lazar’
Kaganovich’s memoir, Pamyatnye zapiski rabochego, kommunista-bol’shevika, profsoyuznogo, partiinogo i sovetsko-gosudarstvennogo rabotnika (Moscow: Vagrius, 1996), pp. 499–502, is vacuous and sheds no new light on the affair. Some of the other new accounts, especially those by children of the main actors, are too fanciful or unreliable to be of any real use. Books in this last category include
Sergo Beria, Lavrentii Beriya: Moi otets (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1994);
A. G. Malenkov, O moem ottse Georgii Malenkove (Moscow: NTTS Tekhnoekos, 1992); and
Pavel Sudoplatov, Spetsoperatsii: Lubyanka i Kreml’, 1930–1950 gody (Moscow: Olma-press, 1997), which is a slightly expanded version of the controversial book published in English in 1994.
The resolution adopted on March 5, 1953, specified that the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers would consist of the chairman, first deputy chairmen, and deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. However, from March 5 until December 7, 1953, the Council of Ministers had no deputy chairmen. Hence, the Presidium of the Council consisted of only five standing members. See Vladimir Ivkin, “Rukovoditeli Sovetskogo pravitel’stva (1923–1991): Istoriko-biograficheskaya spravka,” Istochnik (Moscow), No. 4 (1996): 152–192, esp. 157–163.
This order is recounted by both Colonel Zub in “Zadanie osobogo svoistva” (part 2), p. 6, and Major Hizhnyak Gurevich, an adjutant to Moskalenko who was responsible for guarding Beria during the whole period of his captivity, in Mark Franchetti, “Kremlin Guard Reveals How He Shot Hated Beria,” The Times (London), January 4, 1998, p. 3.
Materials from the investigation and trial of Beria are scattered among several archives in the Moscow area: the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF), the Main Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense (TsAMO), the Special Archive of the Main Military Procuracy in Russia (Osobyi arkhiv Glavnoi voennoi prokuratury RF, or OAGVP), and the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service (formerly the KGB). Among the specific collections are dozens of dela (files) in APRF, 3/24. The dela I saw in this opis’ were 435–471, some of which were marked “sekretno” in parentheses after the file number, indicating that they were from a separate part of the archive that houses the most sensitive materials. From TsAMO, I obtained one file of documents, “Materialy k voprosu o prestupnoi deyatel’nosti Beriya,” 15/178612ss/86, but other materials stored there are inaccessible. The full trial documents are in OAGVP (and copies of many are in the APRF files cited above), but the OAGVP files are off limits. Some portions of the trial materials were released and published in 1989–1991. See M. I. Kuchava, “Iz dnevnika chlena Spetsial’nogo sudebnogo prisutstviya,” and V. F. Nekrasov, “Final (po materialam sudebnogo protsessa),” both in Nekrasov, ed., Beriya: Konets kar’ery, pp. 296–300 and 381–415, respectively; and the seven-part series of materials published by B. S. Popov and V. G. Oppokov, “Berievshchina,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), Nos. 5 and 7 (May and July 1989), pp. 38–41 and 82–87, respectively; Nos. 1, 3, and 5 (January, March, and May 1990), pp. 68–78, 81–90 and 85–90, respectively; and Nos. 1 and 10 (January and October 1991), pp. 44–56 and 56–62, respectively. The archives have declined to predict when (or whether) the full set of documents might be released.
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© 2008 Paul Hollander
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Kramer, M. (2008). Leadership Succession and Political Violence in the USSR Following Stalin’s Death. In: Hollander, P. (eds) Political Violence. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230616240_5
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