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Topics in noncooperative game theory

Part of the Lecture Notes in Mathematics book series (LNMCIME,volume 1330)

Keywords

  • Incomplete Information
  • Mixed Strategy
  • Pure Strategy
  • Stochastic Game
  • Repeated Game

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© 1988 Springer-Verlag

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Zamir, S. (1988). Topics in noncooperative game theory. In: Ambrosetti, A., Gori, F., Lucchetti, R. (eds) Mathematical Economics. Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol 1330. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0078159

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0078159

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50003-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45883-8

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