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© 1988 Springer-Verlag
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Zamir, S. (1988). Topics in noncooperative game theory. In: Ambrosetti, A., Gori, F., Lucchetti, R. (eds) Mathematical Economics. Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol 1330. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0078159
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0078159
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