Abstract
An operational model of crypto-protocols is tailored to the detailed analysis of the secrecy goals accomplished by Kerberos Version IV. The model is faithful to the specification of the protocol presented by the MIT technical plan [14] — e.g. timestamping, double session key delivery mechanism are included. It allows an eavesdropper to exploit the shared keys of compromised agents, and admits the accidental loss of expired session keys. Confidentiality is expressed from the viewpoint of each party involved in a protocol run, with particular attention to the assumptions the party relies on. If such assumptions are unrealistic, they highlight weaknesses of the protocol. This is particularly so from the viewpoint of the responder: the model suggests and proves a reasonable correction.
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Bella, G., Paulson, L.C. (1998). Kerberos Version IV: Inductive analysis of the secrecy goals. In: Quisquater, JJ., Deswarte, Y., Meadows, C., Gollmann, D. (eds) Computer Security — ESORICS 98. ESORICS 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1485. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0055875
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